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This paper develops a dynamic general equilibrium model of North-
South trade and economic growth in a world economy with a continuum
of countries. Countries are diﬀerent in research productivity. Innova-
tion, imitation and the relative wage between countries are endogenously
determined as well as the number of the country that specialize in in-
novative or imitative R&D. We investigate how equilibrium is aﬀected
by globalization, intellectual property right protection, industrial policy,
competition and migration. The model is also extended to introduce
foreign direct investment.
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1 Introduction
The world economy is highly unequal. Of 166 countries, there are 33 countries
whose real income per capita in 2000 is less than 5% of US GDP per capita
in the same year.1 This fact is often explained by diﬀerences in productivity
levels. Caselli (2005) summarizes the literature by noting that about a half
of income diﬀerences is attributable to diﬀerences in total factor productivity.
Although several factors can aﬀect it (e.g. capacity utilization), TFP is gen-
erally interpreted as reﬂecting the level of technology adopted in economies.
Indeed, Klenow and Rodr´ ıguez-Clare (2005) show that real GDP per capita
and the ratio of R&D over GDP are highly correlated. Although this calcu-
lation is suggestive, the ﬁnding accords well with the literature. Moreover,
Lederman and Maloney (2003) demonstrate that “take-oﬀs” of economies like
Korea are often associated with a dramatic surge in the share of R&D in GDP.
Against this background, the present paper aims to examine the link be-
tween R&D and inequality in the world economy in the North-South frame-
work of endogenous technical progress. A deﬁning feature of our model is
that international trade endogenously divides a continuum of countries into
Northern ecconomies with innovative R&D and Southern economies with im-
itative R&D. This allows us to investigate the issue of industrialization and
measure the degree of inequality of the world economy in terms of the num-
ber of developed and developing countries, which is taken as given in existing
studies.
To motivate our paper further, we make two more observations on the
link between R&D and income inequality. First, formal innovative activity
is highly concentrated in rich economies. According to Board (2006), global
R&D expenditure in 2000, which was at least US$729 billion, is performed
by the US and Japan. OECD (2005) also shows only 16% of world R&D
expenditure in 2003 is accounted for by non-OECD countries.2 Furthermore,
DTI (2006) reports that of 1250 ﬁrms from 39 countries, 82.1% of total R&D
expenditure is conducted by companies based in the largest ﬁve countries (US,
Japan, Germany, France and UK). This observation clearly indicates a high
concentration of innovative research activity.
1The world is also unequal in terms of growth. Twenty ﬁve out of 109 countries grew
at the rate of 0.5% or less on average in 1960-2000, whereas the average growth rate of the
sample countries is 1.8%.
2Those countries are Argentina, China, Romania, Israel, Russia, Singapore, Slovenia,
South Africa, Taiwan.
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Second, imitation is pervasive in the world market. For example, the WHO
says that 6%-10% of medicine on the world market or about a quarter of
medicines used in developing countries are counterfeited, and the total sale is
estimated to be more than $35 billion per year.3 Another example is related to
piracy. According to International Data Corporation (2006), 35% of software
installed on PCs in the world in 2005 is illegal with the loss to the indus-
try amountng to more than US$33 billion. Although these numerical claims
should be treated with care,4 it is undenyiable that software piracy is a serious
problem facing the world economy. Indeed, infringement of intellectual prop-
erty rights has been so problematic, that the WTO introduced an agreement
on TRIPS. On the other hand, imitation is widely considered as a means of
technology transfer, which contributes to income convergence across countries
(e.g. Bernard and Jones, 1996). The point is that imitation aﬀects incentives
for innovative R&D, which is an important determinant of inequality across
countries.
We develop a North-South trade model with those two features (concen-
tration of R&D and imitation), which we believe are essential for the analysis
of the link between R&D and inequality across countries. In our model, there
are a continuum of countries with a continuum of variety consumption goods.
Countries diﬀer in productivity of innovative R&D, which expands the number
of variety goods over time. International trade takes place because technol-
ogy transfer occurs through costly imitation. That is, innovating countries,
called North, export innovative goods and import products that are already
copied. Similarly, imitating countries, termed South, export copied goods and
import innovative products. In this setting, comparative advantage based on
innovative R&D cost relative to imitative R&D cost determines the identity
of innovators and imitators. This contrasts with standard trade models where
relative production costs determine trade patters. We believe that trade pat-
terns based on relative reseach productivities are ituitive and consistent with
the world market of many high-tech goods, like computers and biotechnology
products.
Using this model, we show several interesting results. The ﬁrst result con-
3See the following links on these points. http://www.wpro.who.int/media
centre/press releases/pr 20050503.htm (accessed on 25 April 2007) and
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/health/3261385.stm (accessed on 25 April 2007). Those
counterfeit medicines are often used for malaria, TB and Aids.
4Business Software Alliance, which publishes International Data Corporation (2006), is a
trade association and lobby group based in US.
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cerns globalization, which we capture by an increase in the number of countries
with low R&D productivity. A new enterant country into the world trading
system increases not only the growth rate of the world economy, but the num-
ber of Northern countries. That is, globalization is conducive to industrial-
ization of countries which are relatively more productive in innovative R&D
than others. We also consider the eﬀect of strengthening IPR protection in
South. Somewhat surprisingly, the number of Northern economies is shown to
unambiguouly fall in response. This suggests the possibility that stronger IPR
protection stiﬂes the seed of industrialization. Apart from these exercises, we
consider the eﬀects of industrial policy, competition, migration and FDI. We
believe that our approach sheds new light on issues that are discussed in the
literature.
Our model is related to the literature of North-South trade models with
innovation and imitation. This type of investigation started with Grossman
and Helpman (1991) and Helpman (1993). More recent contributions include
Glass and Saggi (2001), Grossman and Lai (2004), Dinopoulos and Segerstrom
(2005). A crucial point of departure of our model from those studies is that
the number of Northern and Southern countries are assumed to be ﬁxed (i.e.
one country in each block) in existing models, whereas our study introduces
a continuum of countries, which are endogenously grouped into North and
South.
Our model is also related to studies on models with a continuum of coun-
tries. For example, Kaneda (1995) and Yanagawa (1996) consider the issue
of industrialization. However, there is no endogenous innovation and/or im-
itation in those studies. Matsuyama (1996) shows that the world economy,
consisting of identical economies, is endogenously divided into countries pro-
ducing a large and small number of variety goods. However, the model is
static in nature. Melitz (2003) is a dynamic trade model with many countries
with heterogeneous ﬁrms. However, his focus is on the role of heterogeneous
ﬁrms and countries remain symmetric before and after trade. A study closest
to ours is Haruyama (2007), who considers a continuum of identical countries
with endogenous technical progress. Without trade, each economy faces the
possibility of poverty trap with no active R&D. Haruyama (2007) explores
whether international trade helps reduce the likelihood of poverty trap.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops the
basic structure of the model. The world economy equilibrium and comparative
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statics are explored in section 3. Section 4 introduces foreign direct investmen
into the model. Section 5 concludes.
2 The Model
2.1 Consumers
There are a continuum of countries, indexed by i ∈ [0,M]. Those economies
are identical in every respect, except the level of productivity of innovative
R&D.
The number of consumers in each country is L. Each of them supplies one











, 0 < α < 1, (2)
where ρ is the rate of time preference, xij is diﬀerentiated products and N de-
notes a range of xij. Given the instantaneous utility (1), the demand function
of xij is given by













where Ei is consumption expenditure in a country i and pij is the price of xij.
Making use of (3) and (4), it is easy to establish that utility-maximizing
total expenditure obeys the familiar Euler condition ˙ Ei/Ei = r − ρ where
r is the rate of interest which is determined in the world ﬁnancial market.
Furthermore, given that a world economy is considered in the paper, it proves
to be useful to deﬁne E =
R M
0 Eidi as the world consumption expenditure.




= r(t) − ρ. (5)
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2.2 Final Output Sectors
Diﬀerentiated products are produced by local monopolists, which hold patents
for the goods. To obtain patents, ﬁrms must succeed in R&D ﬁrst. Patents
are assumed to be protected for ever. However, innovative goods can be copied
through imitative R&D. Economies where product innovation takes place are
called North, and imitation activity takes place in South. In equilibrium,
product cycles occur where products are initially produced in North and the
production site moves to South later. Imitative R&D is a sole source of product
cycles, and the possibility of FDI is initially ruled out. Let N denote the set
of Northern economies.
First consider the pricing decision of Norther ﬁrms. One worker is required
to produce one unit of goods. Given the price elasticity of demand −1/(1 − α)




, i ∈ N (6)
where wi is wage in country i. Wages are shown later to be diﬀerent across
Northern economies because of diﬀerences in innovative R&D productivity.
Northern monopoly ﬁrms in country i which captures the world market earns
πi = (1 − α)σi (t)E (t), i ∈ N. (7)
Turning to South, ﬁrms which succeed in imitative R&D, can produce
goods with marginal cost of wS, which is wage. Wage is identical in all South-
ern economies, since those countries are identical. On the other hand, “other”
Southern ﬁrms are assumed to be able to produce the goods, but with a higher
marginal cost of γwS, γ > 1. The diﬀerence in marginal costs between success-
ful innovators and other ﬁrms is due to the fact that the former gain deeper
knowledge about the product through costly imitative R&D. Given these as-






α for γ ≥ 1/α
1/γ for γ < 1/α
. (8)
The case of θ = 1/γ is a limit price such that products of “other” ﬁrms are
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not demanded. Therefore, imitators’ proﬁts are
πS = (1 − θ)σS (t)E (t). (9)
2.3 R&D
Let m denote the number of Northern countries and M − m the number
of Southern economies. Use Ni to refer to the cumulative number of variety
goods created through R&D in a Northern economy i up to time t, so that N =
R m
0 Nidi holds in steady state. Of these, NS = (M − m)nS number of variety
goods are copied where nS denotes the number of variety goods produced in a
Southern economy. The remaining variety goods are still produced in North,
and their number is denoted by NN =
R m
0 nidi where ni denotes the number of
variety goods that are produced in a Northern economy i. Then, the following
















To describe innovative R&D technology, consider a Northern economy i.
The number of variety goods created in that country increases according to
˙ Ni (t) = aiRi (t)N (t). (11)
Ri is the number of R&D workers and the presence of N captures knowledge
spillover in R&D. Research productivity ai is the only source of diﬀerences
Northern economies. We assume that
∂ai
∂i
< 0, a0 < ∞, aM > 0. (12)
This means that some countries have absolute advantage in innovative R&D,
inducing them to be specialized in innovative R&D and the production of
relatively newer products.
Using (11), one can easily show that the number of variety goods created
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This shows that the world technology advances at a faster rate as more workers
are used in R&D or/and more countries join the group of Northern economies.
Turning to imitative R&D, all countries have access to the same imitation
technology. The number of goods produced in a Southern economy increases
according to
˙ nS (t) = aSRS (t)NS (t). (14)




= aS (M − m(t))RS. (15)
Goods produced in North have diﬀerent prices because Northern wages
are diﬀerent. From Southern imitators’ perspective, however, all Northern
goods are “symmetric”, since proﬁts that Southern ﬁrm gain after imitation
is independent of the origin of country. This implies that Southern imitators
are indiﬀerent to any Northern products as targets of their imitative R&D.
Therefore, we assume that Northern products are randomly imitated. More
speciﬁcally, a given Norther product is assumed to be copied with an instan-
taneous probability of h = ˙ NS/NN during a time interval dt, given that the
range of Southern goods increases by ˙ NS during dt.
Now deﬁne φ = NN/N as the share of Northern goods in all variety goods.
Using this deﬁnition, a Poisson rate of imitation h can be rewritten as




This means that the risk of a given Northern product being copied increases
with the rate of imitation. However, the risk falls with the share of Northern
goods in all variety goods. This is because of the assumption that Southern
imitators randomly choose Northern goods for copying. This means that the
risk of a given product being copied falls as the number of targets for imitation
increases.
Let Vi and VS denote the expected present value of proﬁts earned by North-
ern and Southern monopoly ﬁrms which succeed in innovative and imitative
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R&D, respectively. They are deﬁned by the following equations:
r(t)Vi (t) = πi (t) + ˙ Vi (t) − h(t)Vi (t), i ∈ N (17)
r(t)VS (t) = πS (t) + ˙ VS (t). (18)
h in (17) represents the risk of Northern goods being copied by Southern ﬁrms,
which results in the loss of proﬁts. We assume free entry in R&D sectors
in North and South. Therefore, given R&D technologies (12) and (15), the
following conditions hold.
Vi (t)aiN (t) = (1 − sN)wi (t) (19)
VS (t)aSNS (t) = (1 − sS)wS (t) (20)
where sN and sS are the rates of subsidy or tax to innovative and imitative
R&D.
2.4 Northern Wages
It is useful at this stage to consider Northern wages for later analysis. Substi-






+ g (t) + h(t) + ρ =
(1 − α)aiσi (t)E (t)N (t)
(1 − sN)wi (t)
. (21)
The right-hand side is interpreted as a dividend rate associated with ﬁrms in
country i. Since E/wi is constant in steady state, the dividend rate must be








, i ∈ N, (22)
making use of (6) and (21). This shows that wage is higher in a country with
a higher innovative R&D productivity.
2.5 Comparative Advantage
All consumption goods are traded. In a usual setting, comparative advantage
based on the production costs of those goods would determine trade patterns.
However, the production of goods requires patents for those products, which
are gained only through successful R&D. In addition, the location of produc-
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tion moves to South due to imitative R&D. This implies that R&D produc-
tivity, innovative and imitative, is an important determinant of comparative
advantage. This observation is consistent with the world market of high-tech
industries, such as biotechnology products. That is, there is a strong link be-
tween R&D productivity and comparative advantage. Having said this, ﬁrms
may decide manufacturing location through foreign direct investment on the
basis of production costs or for other reasons. This aspect seems to be increas-
ingly important in these years.5 However, in order to emphasize an important
role of R&D in determining trade patterns, we initially rule out the possibil-
ity of FDI, meaning that the production of high-tech goods must take place
in countries where blueprints for those goods are created and copied through
deliberate R&D.6
Given these assumptions, trade patterns depend on relative costs of in-
novative and imitative R&D. Consider a country i. A unit cost of innova-
tive R&D is CiI = (1 − sN)wi/aiN from (11), and that of imitative R&D is







Given that ai is falling in i, the relative R&D costs are increasing in i, taking
NS/N as given. This is shown Figure 1.
Next, consider Vi/VS, the relative values of innovative R&D to imitative




(1 − α)σi (t)E (t)
VS (t)
h
˙ E (t)/E (t) − ˙ wi (t)/wi (t) + g (t) + h(t) + ρ
i (24)
using (7), (17) and (19). In steady state where E/wi is constant, Vi/VS de-
pends on i only through σi. (4) shows that σi is decreasing in wi, which in
turn means that the relative values of innovative R&D to imitative R&D is
increasing in i due to (22). This is illustrated in Figure 1 where “other” vari-
ables are taken as given. Assuming that a0 is suﬃciently high, the following







5For example, see Markusen (2002).
6This assumption will be relaxed later.
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Those countries have comparative advantage in innovation and is specialized








holds for economies with a lower innovative R&D productivity. They are spe-
cialized in imitative R&D and the manufacturing of copied products. The
threshold country which divides the world into North and South is character-







where m ∈ (0,M). This condition is equivalent to saying that free entry
conditions of innovative and imitative R&D (19) and (20) simultaneously hold
in the threshold country.
2.6 Labor Markets
In a Norther economy i, there are two sources of labor demand: manufacturing
and innovative R&D. In the R&D sector, Ri workers are employed, and man-
ufacturing labor demand is niσiE/pi. Therefore, full employment of workers
in a Northern country i requires
L = Ri (t) + ni (t)σi (t)α
E (t)
wi (t)
, i ∈ N. (28)
Similarly, workers in a Southern economy are fully employed if




3 The World Economy Equilibrium
3.1 Steady State Equilibrium
We focus on steady state with constant E/wi and g = gS. After integrating
(28) from 0 to m, one can rearrange the resulting equation into
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using (13), (16), (21) and (28). This condition captures innovative R&D in-
centives of Northern ﬁrms. Next, the following condition can be derived from
(5), (9), (18) and (29):
ρ + g =
1 − θ
θ
LaS (M − m) − g
1 − sS
. (31)
This equation represents imitative R&D incentives of Southern ﬁrms. The







(1 − φ), (32)




￿α/(1−α). This determines the threshold country m, given
g and φ. An interpretation of (32) is simple. Its right-hand side , which is
equivalent to the right-hand side of (27), is the relative costs of innovative
R&D to imitative R&D. Naturally, the left-hand side of (27) is the relative
value of innovative R&D to imitative R&D. Three equations (30), (31) and
(32) determine g, m and φ.
To reduce the number of endogenous variables, let us write (32) as
φ = φ(g,m), φg > 0, φm > 0, φ(0,m) = 0. (33)
This allows us to rewrite (30) as






Now, we have the system of two equations (31) and (34) with two unknowns
g and m.
We depict the combination of g and m that satisfy (31) by the curve labeled
SS in Figure 2. It is represented by a downward-sloping line. The curve labeled
NN in Figure 2 shows the combination of g and m that satisfy (34). It is
represented by a non-monotonic curve. Appendix B shows that the property
of the NN curve. In principle, multiple equilibria are a possibility. However,
we focus on the case of a unique equilibrium to avoid taxonomic analysis. The
intersection of SS and NN curves at point a deﬁnes the rate of growth rate
and the number of Northern countries in a steady state equilibrium.
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3.2 Other Endogenous Variables
Once equilibrium values of g and m are determined, other endogenous variables
can be recovered. The share of Northern products in all variety goods φ is given
in (33). In Figure 2, an iso-φ contour could be drawn, taking a convex shape
towards the origin.
Regarding a Poisson rate of imitation h, (16) and (33) imply that it relates




, hg ⋚ 0, hm < 0. (35)
Unfortunately, this shows that changes in h in response to parameter changes
are ambiguous in general.
Turning to North-South relative wages, there are two points worth mention.
First, recall that the threshold country has no comparative advantage in either
innovative or imitative R&D. Indeed, this property translates into the result
of wm/wS = 1.7 Second, (22) implies that the following equation must hold





















, i ∈ N.
(36)
The second equality is derived from (A4) in Appendix A. Note that this
equation must hold even in the threshold country if it had been specialized in
innovative R&D. An interpretation of these two results is that the threshold
country is in fact specialized in imitative R&D, and (36) for i = m deﬁnes the
lowest bound of Northern relative wages. This result is illustrated in Figure
3. A jump at m is due to linear R&D technology assumed.
3.3 Comparative Statics
In this subsection, we study the steady state equilibrium properties of the
model. We investigate how the growth rate g and the number of northern
countries m are aﬀected by globalization and other parameters of interest.
7This result can be easily checked by using (32) and (A6) in Appendix A.
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3.3.1 Globalization
Globalization is interpreted as the increase in the number of countries that
join the world trading system. As an example, one can think of the increasing
presence of China in world trade in the last decades. We assume that countries
with lower R&D productivity than a(M) enter the world trading system with
an increase in M. An increase in the size of M implies that g increases for given
m in (31). The SS curve shifts up in (g,m) space, as illustrated in Figure 4.
An increase in Mleads to a new steady state equilibrium point given by b from
a. Thus, the increase in M leads to an increase in both g and m. Intuitively,
the result is explained as follows. When M increases, the scale of southern
countries becomes larger and increases imitative R&D workers, which raises
economic growth (remember g = gS). This makes innovative R&D activities
more proﬁtable, so that the number of countries that operate innovative R&D
increases. Therefore, globalization improves economic growth and promotes
industrialization which can be taken as a shift from imitative to innovative
R&D.
3.3.2 Intellectual Property Right (IPR) protection
In this model, strengthening IPR can be interpreted as an increase of diﬃculty
in imitation activity; a decrease in aS. Suppose that a permanent decrease of
aS occurs by modiﬁng IPR protection policy. A decrease in aS implies that g
decreases for given m in (31). The SS curve shifts down in (g,m) space. Since
∂φ/∂aS > 0 from (32), g increases for given m in (34), shifting up the NN
curve in (g,m) space. The new equilibrium is at point b in Figure 5. Thus,
the decrease in aS decreases m, but the eﬀect on g is ambiguous.
To interpret this result, recall g = gS in steady state. This requirement
implies that a decrease in aS reduces economic growth. A slower growth
makes innovative R&D acitivity less proﬁtable, so that the number of Northern
countries with active innovative R&D falls. On the other hand, a stronger IPR
protection decreases the share of Northern productsφ, implying that workers
availbale for innovating R&D activity increase. This has a positive eﬀect on
economic growth, which makes imitative R&D activity more proﬁtable, so
that the number of Southern counrties rises. As a result, strengthening IPR
protection decreases the number of northern countries, but the eﬀect on g is
ambiguous.
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3.3.3 Innovative R&D productivity
We investigate the eﬀect of an increase in innovative R&D productivity ai.
An increase in ai has no eﬀect on the imitative R&D incentive condition (31).
Using ∂φ/∂am < 0 from (32) and ∂A(m)/∂ai > 0 from (34), an increase in ai
decreases g for given m in (34), which means an upward shift of the NN curve
shift in (g,m) space. In Figure 5, equilibrium moves from point a to point c.
This is a somewhat surprising result, as a higher innovative R&D productivity
is expected to be conducive to industrialization.
Intuitively, an increase in ai increases g, while m decreases. An increase in
the productivity of innovative R&D improves economic growth, which makes
imitative R&D activity more proﬁtable. Then, in steady state imitative R&D
also increases, so that the number of Southern countries (M − m) increases.
As a result, the increase in the productivity of innovative R&D increase the
growth rate and decrease the number of northern countries.
3.3.4 Industrial Policy
Here we consider innovative R&D subsidies and imitative R&D subsidies. Let
us start with the eﬀect of innovative R&D subsidies. Using ∂φ/∂sN < 0 from
(32), an increase in sN increases g for given m in (34). The NN curve shifts up
in (g,m) space and this is illustrated in Figure 6. An increase in sN leads to a
new steady state equilibrium point b from point a. Thus, the industrial policy
promotes growth, but discourages industrialization (i.e. a fall inm). The latter
result is similar to the eﬀect of a higher innovative R&D productivity a(i).
Intuitively, the result is explained as follows. Innovative R&D subsidies in-
creases incentives for innovative R&D, which raises growth. A higher economic
growth makes imitative R&D activity more proﬁtable, so that the number of
Southern countries increases. Consequently, the policy raises growth but de-
creases the number of northern countries.
Next, we examine the eﬀect of imitative R&D subsidies. An increase in sS
implies that g increases for given m in (31). The SS curve shifts up in (g,m)
space. We can also show ∂φ/∂sS > 0 from (32), which means a fall in g for
given m in (34). This implies that the NN curve shifts down in (g,m) space.
The equilibrium moves to c from a in Figure 6. Thus, an increase in sS leads
to a higher m, but the eﬀect on g is ambiguous.
An intuition goes as follows. The subsidies raise economic growth, since
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g = gS holds in steady state. This makes innovative R&D more proﬁtable,
leading to an increase in the number of northern countries. On the other
hand, the imitative R&D subsidies increase the share of Northern goodsφ,
which decreases workers available for innovative R&D. This tends to reduce
growth, which makes imitative R&D activity less proﬁtable. This decreases
the number of southenr counrties, which means an increase in the number of
Northern countries. The eﬀect that the subsidies of imitative R&D have on
steady state equilibrium is the same as the policy of weakening IPR.
3.3.5 Competition
We examine the eﬀect of intensiﬁed competition in the product market. We
two cases, depending on the prices of Southern goods: (i) θ = α,(γ ≥ 1/α) (ii)
θ = 1/γ,(γ < 1/α). First consider the case (i). An increase in α is interpreted
as intensiﬁed competition in both Northern and Southern industries. A higher
α implies that g decreases for given m in both (31) and (34).8 The SS and
NN curve shift down in (g,m) space. These are illustrated in Figure 7. As
a result, intensiﬁed competition in the product market decreases g, but the
eﬀect on the number of northern countries is ambiguous.
Next consider the case (ii). We can examine the competition in each region.
An increase in α represents intensiﬁed competition in Northern industries,
while a decrease in γ represents intensiﬁed competition in Southern indus-
tries. An increase in α has no eﬀect on the Southern condition (31). Using
∂φ/∂α > 0 from (32), an increase in α decreases g for given m in (34). The
NN curve shifts down in (g,m) space. These are illustrated in Figure 8, and
the equilibrium is given by point b. It shows that intnsiﬁed competition in
Northern industries reduces g, and increases m.
On the other hand, a decrease in γ implies that g decreases for a given m
in (31). The SS curve shifts down in (g,m) space. Since we obtain ∂φ/∂γ > 0
from (32), a decrease in γ increases g for given m in (34). The NN curve shifts
up in (g,m) space. These are illustrated in Figure 8, the equilibrium is given
by point c. Intesiﬁed competition in Southern industries decreases m, but the
eﬀect on g is ambiguous.
Note that the negative eﬀect of intensiﬁed competition in Northern in-
dustries on growth is a standard result. However, the eﬀect of intensiﬁed
competition in Southern industries on growth rate can be positive.
8In case (i), we obtain ∂φ/∂α = 0, since ∆ = 1 from (32).
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3.3.6 Migration
We investigate the eﬀect of migration to North from South on equilibrium.
Let denote εNworkers who emigrate to a Northern economy, εS workers who
imigrate from a Southern economy. In equilibrium, the ﬂow into the Northern
economy εNm must be equal to the ﬂow out of the Southern economy εS(M −
m), that is
εS(M − m) = εNm. (37)
In a Northern economy, labor supply increases to L+εN, while labor supply
decreases to L − εS in each of Southern economy. Then, using (37), the SS
curve (31) and the NN curve (34) can be rewritten as
ρ + g =
1 − θ
θ
LaS (M − m) − aSεNm − g
1 − sS
. (38)
ρφ(g,m) + g =
1 − α
α
A(m)[L + εN] − g
1 − sN
. (39)
On one hand, an increase in εN implies that g decreases for given m in
(38). The SS curve shifts down in (g,m) space. On the other hand, an increase
in εN implies that g increases for given m in (39). The NN curve shifts up in
(g,m) space. These are illustrated in Figure 9, the equilibrium point moves to
b from a. Thus, the migration from South to North decreases m, but the eﬀect
on g is ambiguous. It shows that migration is detrimental to industrialization
of Southern economies.
Intuitively, the eﬀect is explained as follows. Migration from Southern
economies has a negative eﬀect on imitative R&D acitivity, which leads to low
economic growth. This makes innovative R&D less proﬁtable, and the number
of Northern countries falls. In contrast, migration to a Northern economy
has positive eﬀect on R&D innovative acitivity, since labor force in each of
Northern economy expands. Furthermore, this eﬀect leads to an increase in
imitative R&D incentives with a rise in the number of Southern countries. In
net, the number of Southern countries (M − m) unambiguously increases.
Migration causes two opposing eﬀects on g, hence the result is ambiguous.
However, a positive eﬀect always dominates the negative eﬀect if migration is
initially small. Using (38) and (39), we ﬁnd that as long as εN (or εS) are
small enough, the eﬀect of migration on growth rate satisﬁes










aS(1 − α)(1 − θ)
αθ(1 − sN)(1 − sS)
￿




























It shows that a marginal rise of migration from zero raises growth.
4 Foreign Direct Investment
4.1 Introduction of FDI
Analysis so far assumes the absence of FDI. This section introduces FDI as
a chanell of technology transfer and discusses how equilibrium properties are
aﬀected. To simplify analysis, all of newly created variety goods in North are
produced in South, and innovative R&D only is conducted in North. Although
these assumptions are simple, they are suﬃcient to highlight key results con-
cerning the eﬀects of FDI.
Let pSF denote the price of Norther products produced in South. The
price of Northern goods is assumed to be higher than the price of Southern







wS = pS. (42)
This assumption is required to generate incentive for Southern ﬁrms to imi-
tatate Northern products.
In a Northern economy, all workers are used for innovative R&D:
L = Ri, i ∈ N. (43)
In a Southern economy, Rs workers are used for imitative R&D, and labor
demand arising from manufacturing Southern products is given by nSxS. On
the other hand, the production of all Northern products in the world requries
workers
R m
0 nixidi. Therefore, a full employment of workers in a Southern
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economy is achieved when the following condition holds.


















































Note that given that all Southern economies are identical, the third term on
the right-hand side of (45) denotes workers used to produce Northern goods
in each of Southern economy.
From (9), (18) and (20), we obtain the following equation;




From (15), (45) and (47), we obtain









LaS (M − m) − g
1 − sS
. (48)
After multiplying (43) by ai, integrating the equation from 0 to m and using
(13), one can rearrange the resulting




From (5), (7), (9), (17), (18), (19), (20) and constant E/w in steady state,
the present value of proﬁts earned by the ﬁrms in threshold country and South-
ern country is given by
Vm =
(1 − α)σSFE












(1 − φ) =⇒ φ = φ(g,m) (51)
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This equation is equivalent to (32), which represents comparative advantage
condition. This allowe us to rewrite (48) as









LaS (M − m) − g
1 − sS
. (52)
Now, we have the system of two equations (49) and (52) with two unknowns
g and m. Those two equilibrium conditions are illustrated in Figure 10.
4.2 FDI v.s. No FDI
Now, we compare the equilibrium of the economy with FDI to that of the base
model without FDI. In Figure 11, (49) is represented by the NNFDI curve
represents and (52) by the SSFDI curve. Equilibrium poins are given by b and
a, respectively. The ﬁgure shows that the NNFDI curve is entirely located
above the NN curve. On the other hand, the SSFDI curve is entirely located
below the SS curve.9
Intuitively, there are two opposing eﬀects on growth. First, FDI reduces
the number of manufacturing workers (to zero in this case), which means that
more workers are available for innovative R&D than in the case of no FDI.
Therefore, FDI tends to increase growth, and this eﬀect is represented by
the relative positions of the NN and NNFDI curves. Second, the number
of workers engaged in imitative R&D activity decreases in each of Southern
country because more workers are employed to manufacture products due to
FDI. Therefore, the rate of imitation falls, and the eﬀect is represented by the
fact that SSFDI curve is located below that SS curve. In net, the eﬀect of
FDI on growth is ambiguous.
On the other hand, the eﬀect of FDI on m is unambiguous. The fact that
FDI increases workers available for R&D in North makes imitative R&D more
proﬁtable. This leads to an increase in the number of Southern economies.
Moreover, the fact that FDI reduces workers for imitative R&D in South ren-
derns innovative R&D less proﬁtable. This eﬀect reduces the number of North-
ern economies. In equilibrium, the introduction of FDI has a negative eﬀect
on the number of North country m. That is, FDI is detrimental to industrial-
ization of Southern economies.
9These are proved in Appendix C.
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5 Conclusion
This paper develops a dynamic general equilibrium model of North-South
trade and economic growth in a world economy with a continuum of coun-
tries. Northern countries are specilized in innovation and the production of
innovative products, and Southern economies in imitative R&D and the manu-
facturing copied goods. Imitation and the division of countries into North and
South are are endogenously determined on the basis of comparative advantage
of research activities. We examined the equilibrium properties of the model
and explored policy implications.
Appendix
A Derivation of (28)






+ gS (t) + ρ =
(1 − θ)aSσS (t)E (t)NS (t)
(1 − sS)wS (t)
. (A1)
From (A1) and (21), in steady state where E/wS and E/wi are constant and
gS = g, we obtain the following equations
















(1 − α)(1 − sS)




1−α ρ + g




using (4), (6) and (8).






ρ + g + h
. (A5)
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(1 − α)(1 − sS)

















Equating (A4) in i = m and (A6) gives (32).
B Properties of (30)
(i) Derivation of φ(g,m): (32) can be rewritten as
ρφ2 + (Γ + g − ρ)φ − g = 0, (B1)
where Γ ≡ ∆ 1−sS
1−sN
am





−(Γ + g − ρ) ±
q




It conﬁrms that one root is positive and the other is negative all values of
(g,m), and the former is a relevant root.
























aS (ρ + g)
q
(Γ + g − ρ)
2 + 4ρg
φ > 0.


















for m = 0 and g = 0. The slope of NN curve is positive at the origin (0,0).
C Properties of NN and SS Curves with FDI
(i) NN curve: the NN curve in no FDI case is given by (34) and in FDI case
by (49). We obtain the slope of these curves as follows

















Lam − ρφm(1 − sN) α
1−α
1 + (1 + ρφg)(1 − sN) α
1−α
, (C1)
Thus, the NN curve with FDI is upward to the NN curve with no FDI, and
these curve intersects at origin.
(ii) SS curve: the SS curve with no FDI is given by (31) and the SS curve
with FDI by (52). These equation is rewritten by












LaS (M − m) − g
1 − sS
(C2)
no FDI: ρ + g =
1 − θ
θ
LaS (M − m) − g
1 − sS
(C3)
The right hand side of the above equations is equivalent and decreases in g,
given m. The left hand side of the above equations increases in g, given m.
The left hand side of FDI case is larger than that of no FDI case. Thus, the
growth rate g in FDI case is lower than in no FDI case for given m, so that the
SS curve with FDI is downward to that of no FDI. Also, these curve intersects
at m = M −ρ/[Las(1−θ)/θ(1−sS)], in which these curve cuts the horizontal
line.
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Figure 2: Steady state equilibrium.














Figure 4: The eﬀect of globalization.


















Figure 6: The eﬀects of subsidies to innovative and imitative R&D.

















Figure 8: The eﬀects of intensiﬁed competition either in North or South only
for γ < 1/α.














Figure 10: An equilibrium in the presence of FDI.










Figure 11: The eﬀect of FDI.
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